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Abstract. Governments today emphasize space systems as critical infrastructures.
Many vital services, including communications, transportation, and maritime
operations, depend on space systems. Cyber systems represent an essential
component that enables effective functioning, configuration, and monitoring of
technological space services. Space systems possess unique vulnerabilities and
properties that attract the attention of hackers, and often with varying motivations.
The private sector increasingly participates in the production of space technologies,
and as a result of the differences in perceptions and priorities of governments and
the private sector, handling the challenges of governance as it relates to the
cybersecurity of space systems presents an avenue for research. Public-private
partnership is one effective way of solving this governance challenge that public and
private entities face. With several possible approaches to building a workable
partnership between the public and private organizations, this paper offers a mixed
approach with the potential to improve the security of space systems, mitigate
vulnerabilities, and run effective campaigns against cyber threats.
Keywords. Critical Infrastructures, Space Systems, Cybersecurity, Dual-use,
Public-Private Partnership, Regulations, Government Incentives

1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare, and national
security of countries. According to the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001", an
industry can be defined as "critical" if damage or unauthorized access to that system
could reasonably:
a. result in the interruption of life-sustaining services,
b. cause catastrophic economic damages, or
c. cause severe degradation of national security [1].
The term critical infrastructure was first used within Executive Order 13010 in 1996
[2]. Since then, governments have always considered cyber threats as one of the
prominent risk actors against critical infrastructures [3]. Although critical infrastructures
existed long before the Internet and the widespread use of cyber technologies, Critical
Infrastructure Protection is defined as an essential governmental term because of the
dominant use of cyber systems in infrastructures. Cyber threats are asymmetric; attackers
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can hide their acts easily, and compared to conventional threats, cyber threats are
extraordinarily cheap and prevalent. Therefore, cyber threats quickly and effortlessly
pave the way for harmful attacks against critical infrastructures. There are many
materialized cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, including nuclear plants,
electrical grids, sewing infrastructures, flight control systems, and harbors [4], [5]. As a
result, cyber resilience of critical infrastructures forms a protruding portion of the
national security efforts of countries.
Cybersecurity is an essential part of the growing security-related concerns of space
infrastructure, including satellites, ground stations, and data links at national, regional,
and international levels. There are a lot of critical systems and applications that depend
on space technologies such as communications, air transport, and navigation systems,
financial and business services, agriculture, transportation, maritime weather and
environmental monitoring, and military defense systems. Many critical infrastructures
depend on space infrastructures, and space infrastructure, in turn, depends on cyber
systems. Furthermore, societies' current substantial and ever-increasing reliance on space
technologies has turned potential vulnerabilities of space infrastructure in the face of
cyber threats, into major national and international security concerns [6] that need to be
addressed at both national and international levels. Given the inextricable linkage
between space and cybersecurity, cyber threats against satellites and other space assets
are often overlooked in critical infrastructure literature [7]–[9].
This paper principally draws on research conducted from two Ph.D. studies. The
first Ph.D. dissertation is titled “Enhancing Cyber Security in Turkey through Effective
Public and Private cooperation” written by Gokhan Ikitemur. The second study is titled
“Developing and Verifying a Set of Principles for the Cyber Security of the Critical
Infrastructures of Turkey” written by Bilge Karabacak. This paper has four sections. The
first section is the introduction. The second section covers the general security posture
and vulnerabilities of, and cyber threats against space systems. The second section also
shares the implications of private sector involvement in space systems and technologies.
The third section provides the details of different approaches towards Public-Private
Partnerships and suggests a mixed approach for space systems cybersecurity. The fourth
section concludes the paper.
2. Background
This section offers a discussion of cyber vulnerabilities and threats associated with space
systems. Following this is a discussion of the implications of private sector involvement
into space systems. The paper posits that the participation of the private sector brings not
only new opportunities but also new challenges in the domain.
2.1. General Security Posture and Vulnerabilities of Space Systems
It would not be wrong to say that the potential exploitation of space systems
vulnerabilities by cyber threats is not a new phenomenon. Today, as space systems
become critical to all components of national and international infrastructure, the
recognition of cyber risks and vulnerabilities is a matter of necessity. Cyber
vulnerabilities of space-based capability is a source of growing concern for national
security [8], [10], [11]. Unfortunately, the cybersecurity of space systems and assets are
not emphasized enough within the policy domain. When the national space security
policies of countries with advanced cybersecurity capabilities are reviewed, it is
observable that these countries do not perform well in terms of analysis and identification

of cyber risks against space-based assets, as well as the mitigation of risks to protect
these assets.
In comparison to other digitized critical infrastructure, such as energy grids, spacerelated assets appear more vulnerable to cyberattacks; thus, potentially hindering
economic prosperity and endangering societies [7], [8]. Except for some more modern
systems such as the European Galileo, civilian applications of widely used space
technologies, such as the Global Navigation Satellite Systems are relatively insecure, as
they have not been designed with security in mind, given that the space race began only
in the 1950s with the launch of Sputnik. Exacerbating current security concerns,
digitalization of space assets has increased to a level that a highly sophisticated and wellresourced cyberattack to space assets can cripple national and international capabilities
[8]. Moreover, the fact that cyberspace is still a growing field with its deficiencies and
inconsistencies, the potential impact of vulnerabilities have worsened and widened.
According to the Livingstone and Lewis, although the level of national cybersecurity
readiness for many countries has increased and their overall cybersecurity approach has
become more active, "the conjunction of cyber and space remains vulnerable to
exploitation in the context of complex and internationalized supply chains and spacerelated infrastructure". Livingstone and Lewis further claim that space activities'
vulnerability to cyberattack lagged behind the other areas in the field of cybersecurity
because the challenge is generally overlooked in cybersecurity discussions [8]. For
example, although roles and responsibilities for securing outer space and cyber domain
are increasingly converging [12], at the UN where threats to nations states are dealt with
at the highest level, UN governmental group of experts (GGE) 's including outer space
and on cyberspace, have not adequately addressed such a convergence in their respective
agendas [8].
2.2. Cyber Threats against Space Systems
Space assets are dramatically becoming more attractive for adversaries, especially as the
critical functions associated with them exponentially increase in a growing number of
national critical infrastructure systems. Furthermore, goods and services provided
through space assets and technologies in our daily lives have increased rapidly, further
stimulating economic growth worldwide. As states' dependency on space technologies
increases, governments need to provide space-based critical systems with a high level of
cyber protection. This is particularly vital for developed states as well as countries with
similarly reported or known vulnerabilities [8], [13].
Potential adversaries that are likely to exploit current space-related cyber
vulnerabilities can vary in motivation and goals. They can be:
a) Nation-states seeking to maximize their national interests through several ways
such as stealing intellectual property and gaining a military advantage,
b) Well-resourced organized crime groups aiming to obtain financial gains,
c) Terrorist organizations with sophisticated capabilities striving to promote their
illicit causes, and
d) Talented individuals desiring to achieve their differing personal agenda.
There are indications of alarming situations in which cyber actors threaten the
conjunction of space and cyber. Three examples are noteworthy: firstly, any
sophisticated adversary can take over a satellite and turn it into a space weapon by merely
changing in its orbit. Collision with another satellite will potentially follow this. Such

collision will create space debris that may also pose critical risks for other satellites.
Secondly, although with highly asymmetrical results, the US Department of Defense's
2018 auditing exercise showed that its ballistic missile defense systems possessed
internal control weaknesses that could be exploited through cyber tools. Such
interference via cyber tools targeting the control systems of these missile systems may
result in loss of life [13]. Thirdly, according to the 2014 US National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration report, its Satellite Data Information System was targeted
by hackers, and it was taken offline for almost 48 hours in September 2014 [10].
Cyber threats with diverging interests and capabilities are expanding and
transforming at an unprecedented speed, and they encompass space systems. There are
several reasons for this expansion and transformation. First, the functioning of modern
satellite systems is increasingly reliant on cyber technology. Internet-based networks are
used in space assets, including the operation of satellites. This connection can turn those
assets into "devices on the Internet of Things” [12]. This also makes space assets more
accessible and vulnerable from anywhere in the world to any adversary with access to
the Internet. Cyberattacks targeting a satellite's controls, reliability, or bandwidth
availability would pose a compelling challenge to critical national infrastructure [14].
Another factor that complicates the challenge is that space-based technologies are highly
essential for the provision of data and services in air, land, cyber, and sea domains. Thus,
any failure caused by adversaries to space infrastructure will have the potential to cascade
to other domains. As previously stated, “insecurity-by-design” is a big challenge. As
digital technologies become more of a fundamental part of space-dependent capabilities,
and space-based assets' connectivity to the Internet and other public networks increases,
adversaries will be able to find new avenues through these vulnerabilities in order to
infiltrate space systems [13].
Consequently, space systems insecurity is a direct challenge to critical national
assets and national security [13]. These challenges have created opportunities for
adversaries to launch high-impact attacks on state-owned strategic assets. The
asymmetric nature of cyber threats will be in favor of less developed nation-state
adversaries, terrorist groups, and other actors such as organized criminals, and will
continue to enable them to attack the nation-states that have a much higher reliance on
digital technologies [13]. Besides, the effect of propagating failures caused by cyber
threats will increase because of increasing critical interdependencies between space
systems and other domains.
2.3. Implications of Private Sector Involvement into Space Systems and Technologies
Space is becoming a more “congested, contested, and competitive” area where an everincreasing number of actors other than nation-states such as international organizations,
and private sector companies are being represented [11]. New actors entering the game
will inevitably complicate already existing cybersecurity concerns of national actors in
the space domain. Cyber-related governance challenges between the private sector and
the public sector will be another point of concern in this new frontier. In a 2017 National
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) study, it was revealed that US governmental
entities have exceptional cybersecurity capabilities that are crucial in cyber defense of
critical infrastructure. However, the effectiveness of these entities' is constrained mainly
because private sector awareness of these capabilities is limited. It is currently highly
probable that such governance challenges will be repeated in the cyber domain [15].

Today, an essential share of Internet-dependent critical infrastructures, such as
telecommunications, energy, and transportation are privately owned [16]. Although we
can use existing models that promote public-private cooperation to protect critical
infrastructure assets for space systems, many challenges such as to what extent
government institutions can share information with the private sector are still an open
debate item. Furthermore, it is still unclear as to what extent governments could consider
regulating the private sector, especially urging them to make certain cybersecurity
investments. In turn, it is also not clear to what extent such government measures may
hinder the private sector's dynamism and creativity. Another possible question relates to
what extent the private sector could be held accountable when a cyber-breach or potential
misconduct cause harm to civilians. These are governance challenges that need to be
solved in order to protect space-based critical assets adequately.
Technological advances lower costs of space activities, paving the way to an influx
of market forces into this domain. Today the space market is estimated to be worth £125
billion. Furthermore, the global space-enabled market is projected to be as big as
approximately £400 billion by the year 2030 [17]. Private satellite services contribute to
several sectors from agriculture, transportation, maritime to environmental monitoring.
The growing reliance on commercial satellites has reached the extent that some of the
military requirements are met by private sector capabilities [9]. The commercial use of
space will enhance productivity, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and lower costs
in many sectors. This process, however, will lead to the marketization of the space
domain that will potentially harm inadequate efforts to protect critical space assets
against cyber threats. With the increased participation of private entities into space efforts
by using cutting-edge technologies, the private sector will capitalize on highly sensitive
and valuable data that will be targeted by adversaries especially for cyber espionage in
order to steal intellectual property.
The analysis of the US’ Public-Private Partnership over the last 20 years reveals
some positive progress. A US General Accounting Office (2002) report pointed out that
although the growing importance of satellites requires further protection, government
efforts on national critical infrastructure protection did not include the satellite industry
[18]. Furthermore, there was no suggestion in the 2002 version of the US National
Strategy for Homeland Security to include the satellite industry in the nation-wide
approach to protecting critical infrastructures from the entities that are responsible from
securing those assets against cyber threats [19]. According to the 2017 National Security
Strategy report, government entities will cooperate with the space industry to enhance
the resilience of the US's space architecture [20]. When necessary, the US government
will consider covering private sector companies with national security protections.
However, there is no provision for establishing any mechanism to carry out such a task.
Private sector companies have an incentive to minimize their costs and innovate
rapidly. Characteristically, the private sector will seek maximum profit in space, most
probably at the sacrifice of necessary cybersecurity measures to protect space assets.
Therefore, it is likely that cybersecurity will not be a primary concern in private-sector's
space activities, especially in a time when market forces are starting to dominate space
[12]. This characteristic feature of the private sector is profoundly incompatible with the
realities of cyber and space fields, as cyber threats become imminent. On the other side
of the coin, there is no clear information regarding to what extent private sector owned
critical space assets have been a victim of such attacks, as the private sector is ever
concerned that public disclosure of a security breach could potentially ruin their
companies’ reputation and result in liability issues [7]. According to the results of the

2017 Black Hat Survey, IT and security professionals from more than 15 European
countries are convinced that a cyber attack will breach critical infrastructure across
multiple countries and that an attack with huge impact will occur within the next two
years [21]. Another striking revelation comes from the Council on Foreign Relations’
Preventive Priorities Survey 2019. The attendees, who are government officials, foreign
policy experts, and academics, ranked the threat of a highly disruptive cyberattack on the
US critical infrastructure and networks as the utmost concern to homeland security [22].
National actors have been increasingly facilitating the private-sector adaptation of
dual-use technologies in space [12]. These technologies are also increasingly becoming
a response to the shrink in national defense budgets [23]. Although there is no generally
accepted definition of dual-use [24], the term “dual-use technologies” are used to denote
civilian applications that can also be used for military purposes [25]. The main difficulty
for dual-use technologies is that they can be exploited beyond their initial applications
[26]. Initially, there was a determination to separate military space systems from
commercial and civilian assets regarding their development and operation. This
determination has eroded in the face of private sector's success that not only caused a
decrease in defense expenditures but also reached a level that has proved itself as
effective as military technology especially when it comes to the capture and analysis of
satellite imagery [13]. For instance, the US reliance on private sector assets for military
purposes increased by almost 560 percent during the Iraq war of 2003 [27]. However,
the dual-usage of space-related technologies increase risks by further blurring line
between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ activities in cyber and space, having complicated
repercussions in both domains. According to Baylon (2014), taking into consideration
the dual use of those technologies, it becomes challenging to determine whether a space
asset is developed only for civilian purposes, or whether this asset enables a military
application as well. This, in turn, might provoke other actors in space to improve their
space capabilities. Lack of clarity in terms of which critical space asset is used as a war
component can result in adversaries targeting civilian assets in warfare. Therefore,
adversaries could aim to wreak havoc not only on strategic weapons systems but also on
civilian space assets. The blurring line between ‘military' and ‘civilian' applications at
this juncture could also undermine deterrence and strategic stability as it causes
uncertainty and confusion. In such environments, cyber offense prevails cyber defense
as the former is technologically easier and more cost-effective than the latter [8], [26].
This will make offensive actions rather than defensive measures in the cyber and space
arena the acceptable behavior. Justification of offensive behavior under the guise of
defensive ones will diminish mutual trust and harm strategic decision-making processes
as the risk of deception among actors in the space domain. If the threat landscape fosters
an ambiguity of intent for state actions, even peaceful state actions such as commercial
use of a satellite may trigger suspicion among other states. After construing another
state's actions as offensive, states will increase their perceived threat level. This will, in
turn, contribute to the escalatory cycle. This circle finally will culminate in the
militarization of the space and cyber fields. A potential cyber arms race in space is not
the future that will best serve the parties in space [11], [28].
The transformation is unfolding in this junction, where cyber meets space levels the
playing field in a way that the public and private sector is not organized to respond
appropriately. Policymakers and the space industry struggle to grasp the full implications
of cyber threats in the context of both cyber and space-related critical assets. Because of
the growing interconnectedness and interdependence between the cyber and space
sectors, there is a need to apply measures other than applying higher-grade military

hardening and cyber defense measures to civilian and commercial space assets with the
capability of supporting military applications [12]. Securing critical national
infrastructure would not only enhance the level of civilian preparedness and resilience
but also it would help to minimize risks and threats facing governments in both cyber
and space domains [13]. These measures are detailed in the next section.
3. A Mixed Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Approach for Space Systems
Cybersecurity
Before focusing on the possible PPP incentives between the government and the private
sector, it should be emphasized that the private sector needs to be aware that their
decisions and ability to maintain organizational security could directly impact public
vulnerability. For that reason, when protecting critical infrastructures like space systems,
corporate owners should focus not only on organizational costs, but also on the potential
“social costs” in the event of a cyber attack [29]. PPP is one of the essential instruments
for the private sector to ensure an inclusive focus on costs. The other side of PPP is that
“the state is incapable of providing the public good of security on its own” [30]. It is also
argued that governments are unlikely to achieve high levels of cyber defense and
resilience without resorting to PPPs [31]. As a result, PPP is one of the essential
mechanisms to facilitate space systems’ cybersecurity collaborations between the
governments and private actors.
The U.S. 2010 National Security Strategy places particular emphasis on PPPs and
exhorts the executive branch to collaborate with the private sector. Government agencies
such as the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the State Department are
working to deliberately harness the private sector’s capabilities in their efforts to achieve
national security [32]. The same remains applicable to the EU. In his 2013 study, Irion
focuses on Network and Information Security (NIS) governance in the EU and examines
cooperation between public and private organizations that operate information and
communications technology (ICT) networks. He concludes that effective NIS
governance can be achieved by taking advantage of PPPs together with clearly-defined
governance mechanisms. There are three distinct approaches to facilitate PPP. Hathaway
and Klimburg argue that the way to encourage private businesses to adopt a “wholenation-approach” is to provide them with various incentives, ranging from enhanced
security support to indirect commercial benefits [33]. The other approach is the
regulation of the private sector. Even though commercial instruments can motivate
private businesses to join forces with the state, many governments generally prefer legal
means such as regulations to coerce their subjects [34]. Stavridis and Farkas define
public-private collaboration as a voluntary interaction between governments and private
organizations to achieve resource efficiency. According to the authors, cooperation with
the private sector does not necessarily involve financial transactions or even contracts; it
can be entirely voluntary [32]. Lewis argues that while strict government regulation is
necessary for such fields as banking, commerce, and transportation when it comes to
regulating cyber domains, a voluntary partnership model suffices [35]. Some experts
oppose the voluntary approaches for PPP as the primary means of enhancing resiliency
and cybersecurity; they argue that governments should utilize regulatory measures to
fully take advantage of available resources [36], [37]. In a white paper jointly prepared
by Business Software Alliance, Center for Democracy & Technology, US Chamber of
Commerce, Internet Security Alliance, and TechAmerica, more cyber regulations mean

more burdens for American companies in the private sector, rendering them
uncompetitive in the marketplace. As a result, they claim that hierarchies must be
replaced with alternate structures capable of promoting security, competition, and
collaboration across multiple fronts [38].
Authors of this paper argue three factors make the voluntary participation of the
private sector inefficient. These factors are:
a. The private sector is an indispensable actor in the development of space
systems,
b. Cybersecurity of space system is an emerging and critical national security
domain,
c. Space systems are critical assets within the scope of nations and a domain of
competition in the international context.
As a result, the private sector’s participation in space systems’ cybersecurity should
not be a voluntary matter. Otherwise, it may not engage to the full extent possible, and
cybersecurity efforts of space systems could resultantly fail. Nevertheless, government
regulation should not be the only approach for cybersecurity efforts of space systems.
Instead of strong regulatory approaches, a blend of approaches can be more efficient. For
example, Clinton argues that the government should compensate private businesses for
cybersecurity investments exceeding their commercial needs [39]. An essential benefit
of adopting a mixed approach would be to refrain from the possible failures of voluntary
PPPs. Even if they can function as successful networks, PPPs are not flawless structures
in and of themselves. PPPs can be limited in addressing complex challenges due to their
lack of strong leadership and clear policy goals [40].
Similarly, a 2008 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
entitled "Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency" points out that many
cybersecurity PPPs have suffered because of poorly defined goals and objectives, as well
as from a lack of coherently defined strategies and partnership plans [41]. In a recent
study that measures the organizational variables associated with cybersecurity
preparedness, insufficient government guidance is one of the factors that contribute to
the organizational barrier for making cybersecurity preparation [42]. As a result, a mixed
approach, incorporating both incentives, government leadership, and voluntary actions
could be useful in space system cybersecurity efforts.
4. Conclusion
As the private sector increasingly participates in the production of space technologies,
some governance challenges arise, and they may affect the cyber resilience of space
systems. Almost all nations emphasize the importance of Public-Private Partnerships
within national cybersecurity strategies. Partnerships between public and privates entities
should be created for cybersecurity of space systems as well because PPP is an effective
way of solving the governance challenge among public and private entities. However,
there are several approaches to building a partnership between public and private
organizations, and there are some disputes regarding which method should be used for
national cybersecurity efforts. In this paper, a mixed PPP approached is suggested to
improve cybersecurity space systems, mitigate vulnerabilities, and run effective
campaigns against cyber threats. By this combined approach, both voluntary
participation, government incentives, and government regulations should be effectively
and harmoniously employed.
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